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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
On March 21, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court transferred
this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) .x
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether Images may raise arguments and issues on

appeal regarding alleged fraudulent misrepresentations which were
not presented to the trial court/ which were not preserved before
the court below; which cannot form the basis of a fraud claim;
which were decided against Images in a parallel arbitration
proceeding; and which are barred by the proper application of the
collateral estoppel doctrine.2
II.

Whether the trial court's finding that Macris was

not the agent of Macris & Associates, Inc. ("M&A") and/or that
M&A was not the alter ego of Macris may be reversed when Images
has failed to marshal the substantial evidence supporting the
trial court's findings, and when other unchallenged findings
render the agency/alter ego question moot.
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding testimony of William Crismon when Images violated the
court's order and failed to identify him as a witness for more
than one month after the discovery cut-off date even though it

39560

1

Not § 78-2a-3(k) [sic] as alleged in Appellant's Brief.

2

Not res judicata as alleged in Appellant's Brief.

knew of Mr. Crismon and could have identified him as a witness,
when Images failed to proff€>r his testimony when the trial court
subsequently allowed other previously excluded witnesses'
testimony, and when William Crismon's testimony would only have
been cumulative of other testimony.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The few determinative Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
are set forth below.
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection.• In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike
appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from
the context; or
(2) Offer of proof.
In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from
the context within which questions were asked.

This Rule is dispositive of the third issue on appeal
since Images did not make a proffer of William Crismon's
testimony.
Rule 37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in relevant part:

38560

2

(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If
a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery, including an order made under
Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the
court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others the following:
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in
evidence; . . . .
This Rule is dispositive of the issue regarding William
Crismon's exclusion as a trial witness because Images failed to
comply with the trial court's discovery order.
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides:
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the
order indicated:
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review,
including for each issue: the standard of appellate
review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court; or . . . .
This Rule is dispositive of most of the issues on this
appeal because Images has failed to comply with this provision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is yet another chapter in a series of long,
multiple, tortuous proceedings undertaken by Images to avoid
paying what Images repeatedly has been found liable for in at

33560
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least two separate arbitration proceedings and one trial.

In

each of those proceedings, it was found that Images breached the
subject contracts with Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") and Macris &
Associates, Inc. ("M&A"); Images was not fraudulently induced to
enter into contracts with either of those entities; and Images
owes substantial damages to both Affinity and M&A.
The essential facts of this case are clearly and
succinctly set out in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law, a copy of which is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit I.3
Briefly stated, in the spring of 1989, Images' President, Thomas
Mower ("Mower"), entered into negotiations with Michael Macris
("Macris"), who was acting on behalf of two separate
corporations, Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") and Macris &
Associates, Inc. ("M&A")*.

Appellant's Brief at 6-7.

Images

concedes that as a result of those negotiations, it entered into
two related contracts:

a supply contract with Affinity (the

"Affinity Contract") whereby Affinity would supply nail gels and
special curing lamps for artificial nails, and a distributorship
contract and addendum thereto with M&A (the "M&A Contract")
wherein M&A would be allowed to participate as a distributor,
principally to market the nail products, in Images' multilevel
marketing program and would be "auto-qualified" to receive

3

Hereinafter, references to the relevant Findings of Fact
are referred to as "Finding(s)."
38560
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c o m p e n s a t i o n as a " p r e s i d e n t i a l " d i s t r i b u t o r w i t h o u t h a v i n g to
meet a n y of the usual q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for r e c e i v i n g
a x ti lat: ] eve]

compensation

See id . at: 7 8 ..

W i t h i n a short p e r i o d of time, trouble d e v e l o p e d
b e t w e e n Images and both c o m p a n i e s wi t:h w h i c h M a o r i s w a s
a s s o c i a t: e d .

S e v e r a ] t i n i e s :i i i 1 9 9 0

11 n a g e s s t o p p e d m a k i n g

p a y m e n t s to M & A as a d i s t r i b u t o r , u n i l a t e r a l l y w i t h d r e w
dIst r i b u t o r s from M&A' s "downIine" organi z at ion,
t e i m i i i a t: i o r I D f t: 1: i e M & A C o i 11: i a c t:,
terminations.

and threatened

11: i i a g e s 1; :i t: 1 I d i: e w t h e s e a t: t: e m p t e d

See M e m o r a n d u m D e c i s i o n copy attached to the

A p p e n d i x as Exhibit 2 at ]\ 1 7.
' rhe parties sparred, w i t h one another, but no
r e s o l u t i o n s ox thei r d i s p u t e s were reached

0'n M a r c h 7 , 1 9 9 1 ,

Images advise d M & A t h a t i t w a s d i s c o n t i n i :i :i i I g t ]: i e a i 11 o q u a l i f i c a t i o n status of the d i s t r i b u t o r s h i p for lack of activity.
This c o n s t i t u t e d a m a t e r i a l b r e a c h of the M & A C o n t r a c t b y Images.
F:i ndii lg N D

3 7

0: i • : r aboi it: Mar ::h 2 9

1 99]

Ii nages a d v i s e d MS A

that It w a s c o n s i d e r i n g t e r m i n a t i n g the d i s t r i b u t o r s h i p

entirely,

not just its a u t o - q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t a t u s , citing a n u m b e r of
p i i rp o r t ed re a s o n s

S e e F i n d i n g s N o s . ± 1 a i i • :I 4 2

" I" h 5 t: r :i a 1 c o i 11 t:

found these reasons to be without m e r i t , p r e t e x t u a l a n d n o t
justifying termination.

Ld. Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e to this

a p p e a 1, n o n e o f t: h e p u r p o r t e d r e a s c i i s f c r i

33560
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:.-... n

'

3

or termination of the M&A Contract included any alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations by Macris.
On April 17, 1991, M&A filed suit alleging that Images
breached the M&A Contract.
appeal.

It is this action which is now on

This matter is hereinafter referred to as "the M&A

Litigation."
Affinity, Macris' other company supplying (a) nail gels
activated by ultraviolet light and (b) lamp housings to Images,
initiated an arbitration proceeding, Affinity, Inc. v. Images
International, Inc. alleging breach of contract.

In May, 1992,

the Arbitrator found that Images breached its contract with
Affinity and awarded damages of $144,313 to Affinity.
834-35.)

(See R.

On June 19, 1992, this arbitration award was entered as

a judgment in the Fourth'Judicial District Court for Utah County,
State of Utah, in the matter of Affinity, Inc. v. Images
International, Inc., Civ. No. 92-9400015 (Harding, J . ) . 4

(See

R. 834 at H 7.)
After the attempted execution on the arbitration award,
Images further complicated the legal proceedings by filing a

4

When Affinity sought to execute on its judgment by
seizing Images' assets, Images delayed such execution by
producing documentation that the assets being seized were owned
by a third party. Affinity subsequently proved that this
document was a fabrication which was back-dated and falsely
notarized by Mower's mother-in-law.
(See R. 833-34 at HH 7, 12
and 14.) Based on this information, the court lifted the stay of
execution. (Id. at H 15.)
38560
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complaint in the Fourth J udicial District Court for U t a h County,
State of Utah

(Images & A t t i t u d e s , Inc., et a l . v. Affinity,

Inc . , et al

C. i <

N : • 9 2 0 4 00 4 74

(Pa:i : ] :

J )

E J 1 eging thai

., i 1

had b e e n f r a u d u l e n t l y induced to enter into the A f f i n i t y
Contract; and asking that the a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d and judgment in
A f f i i I :i t A,

>e s e t a s i de .

J\ i dg e P a i k s i ib s e qu e n t ] y s t a ye d

that a c t i o n p e n d i n g the c o m p l e t i o n of m a n d a t o r y a r b i t r a t i o n .
Images then filed two separate a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s w h i c h were
s u b s e q u e i 111 y c • :> i i s o ] :i d a t e d a s E c 1 a t, 11 I c ,. , f / k./ a 11 n a a e s v ,.
Affinity, Inc. , C o n s o l i d a t e d N o s . 81 818 0 0 2 6 93 and 81 - 181006092
(American A r b i t r a t i o n A s s o c i a t i o n )

(Verhaaren, Arb.)

ref erre< I i : : > « i: ; • "" 1 1: I e A f f i r i:i • :y Ai 1: »i t r at: i oi i''")

(herei n a f t e r
See R . 8 3 4 , 5 ] 52 .

In the course of the Affinity Arbitration and the M&A
Litigation,

Images 5 claimed that it had beei i fraudulently

induced to enter into each of the two contracts by Maoris'
allegedly false statements to Mower during the negotiation of the
two contracts
7 - 8 .6

(R

1 1 90

284 86 . )

See also Appe] ] ant ' s Bi: i ef at

In t he t ri a1 cou r t b e1ow, Images' a f f i r m a t i v e claim o f

"fraudulent i n d u c e m e n t " was first c o n t a i n e d in its S e p t e m b e r 10,
1992 A m e n d e d C o u n t e r c l a i m and T h i r d - P a r t y C o m p l a i n t against: M& A

In actuality, in the M&A L i t i g a t i o n , Images and M o w e r
asserted claims against M&A and M a c r i s . For the sake of brevity,
Images and M o w e r are referred to c o l l e c t i v e l y as "Images."
6

Indeed, on pages 7 and 8 of its A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, Images
continues to assert that both of the c o n t r a c t s were fraudulently
induced.
39560
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and Maoris.

(R. 281-294.)

Therein, Images alleged that Maoris

represented that a Dr. Lyman invented the nail gel system being
supplied and that Maoris had $250,000 of advertising in place.
(See R. 285-286.)

No allegation was made, as is now asserted on

appeal, that Macris represented he would recruit "big hitters."
In an October 12, 1992 Memorandum, Images contended
that fraudulent representations regarding "an [sic] National
Inquirer [sic] advertising campaign was forthcoming, and the
misrepresentation as to the quality and composition of the newly
developed" nail gel induced Images to enter into the M&A
Contract.

No claim was made that Macris misrepresented his

ability to get "big hitters."
In a February 22, 1990 letter from Mower to Macris at
Affinity, Inc. (R. 884-888), Mower confirmed that this same
representation regarding advertising in the National Enquirer
induced Images to enter into the Affinity Contract:
You then approached Images with a proposal to market
the [nail] system through a nationwide advertising
campaign beginning with the prestigious National
Enquirer magazine . . . Images issued the [purchase
order to Affinity] and made an enormous financial
commitment. This was based on two items and two items
only.
1. The systems would be ran [sic] in the Enquirer
and other publications.
2.
October

The Enquirer article was to be in
....

Let me make one point crystal clear . . . Images
took on the line and made that extraordinarily large

38560
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purchase because of o n e and ONLY O N E THING. T h e fact
that y o u proposed the N a t i o n a l E n q u i r e r deal to
i is

Ten months after the filing of the A m e n d e d
C o u n t e r c l a i m , Images r e s p o n d e d t:c :i i 11:errogatori es wh:i c 1 ] re• :j\ ii r e d
Images to provide the details of its fraudulent
claim.

(See R. 1097-1102.)

N u m e r o u s alleged

w e r e i d e n t i f i e d :i n c ] i i i i n g ' •' • -

misrepresentation

representations

• :i i I g t : D r

a d v e r t i s i n g with the National Enquirer.

L y rn a i I a n d

Notably , no c o n t e n t i o n

was made that Macr:i s represented that he wouId recruit "big
1 ij Iters " to become di stri bi itors of linages " ± i u> in :t ^ .
On September 2 3 , 1993, Mower submitted an a f f i d a v i t to
the trial court wherein he admi tted that t h ^ alleged
t i 11 si epreser Itat ioi Is r egar dii ig D] : I »\ i i: iai i s :i i iv o 1 v e m e n t w i t h t:he
nail system and the purported a d v e r t i s i n g w o r t h $ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 to
$2, 500, 000 w:i t:h the National E n q u i r e r were made p r i o r to entering
:i i 11: : 11 i e A f f i i I 1 t y c • D n t r a c t: (w h i c h preceded the M & A c o n t r a c t ) , and
induced him to enter into both c o n t r a c t s ,

(See R. 794-79'; )

(See a l s o

i 10 c ] a i m of

R . 10 0 9 at: *|*I

6 and '7 )

Aga i n

inducement w a s made based upon a n y alleged

f r a i idi A e n t

representation

regarding recruitment of "big hitters A'
While these p r o c e e d i n g s were going or i In the M & A
L i t i g a t i o n , the Affinity A r b i t r a t i o n w a s also p r o g r e s s i n g .

On

N o v e m b e r 8, 1 9 9 3 , the a r b i t r a t o r dismissed with p r e j u d i c e Images'

38560
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claim that Images had been fraudulently induced to enter into a
contract with Affinity.

The arbitrator held that:

Affinity made no misrepresentations of
material facts to [Images] to induce [Images]
to enter into the Agreement and [Images], in
any event, did not reasonably rely on the
alleged misrepresentations.
(R. 1214.)
Images then filed a Motion for Modification of Order
with the arbitrator, arguing that the above-quoted language
should be stricken from the arbitrator's Order of Dismissal.

It

made a critical admission for the purposes of the instant appeal,
i.e., that the arbitrator's ruling would collaterally estop it
from asserting a fraudulent inducement claim in the M&A
Litigation.

(See R. 1222-1223.)

The arbitrator denied Images' Motion for Modification
of Order, and again held that: "the Affidavits filed by the
parties amply demonstrate that Affinity made no
misrepresentations of material facts to [Images] to induce
[Images] to enter into the agreement and that [Images] did not,
in any event, reasonably rely on the alleged misrepresentations."
(R. 1210.)
On December 11, 1993, M&A filed a Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in the M&A
Litigation advising the trial court of the arbitrator's Order of
dismissal in the Affinity Arbitration and arguing that Images'
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fraudulent inducement claims were barred under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.

(R. 1188.)

More specifically, M&A argued

that Images had not" asserted any fiarf.s in support

^f it:1:

fraudulent inducement claim :i n the M&A Litigation which "were not
set forth or raised in its memoranda or oral argument in" the
Affini ty Arbil ration

i i-

I i T! )

.

at: t:l le :i ssue :)f fraudu .-. ..

i n d u c e m e n t h a d b e e n lully, fairly, a n d c o m p l e t e l y l i t i g a t e d to a
final j u d g m e n t in that, .action (R

13 83-86.)

Thi is, I m a g e s shoul d

. ..' p e d f i c i t t r e 1 i t i g a t: i i i g f i: a u d u 1 e i I t: i i i d u c e m e i 11.

espon "e to that: si lpplemental memorandum,
L-.-.-.-. -.

.*.--.

... .

Images

:i i i Support: of Defendai its' Motion to Strike

and in Copesition to Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Maoris
& Assoc!ires, Inc.' - and Mike Maoris' Motion for summary Judgment
Regarding : r a u j . _ : /

Inducement.

(R

1 195-1206. )

Therein,

Images raised three arguments before the t:r ial court in
o p p o s i t i o n t: : • M & A ' , s :: • D ] ] a t: e r a ] e s t o p p e 1 a r g i i m e n t:, :> n 1 } • o n e :> f
which it pursues on this appeal. 7

That argument is that

Images first argued that the supplemental memorandum in
which M&A raised its collateral estoppel argument was not
authorized under Rule 4-501(1)(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, and that M&A's Supplemental Memorandum, together
with its collateral estoppel argument, must be stricken. (R.
1203-1205.) The trial court rejected this argument, holding that
striking the Supplemental Memorandum "would result in keeping
relevant information from this Court that is dispositive of
issues before this Court."
(R. 1234.) Images does not appeal
this decision.
38560

the issue of fraudulent inducement was not
fully and fairly litigated in the
arbitration, thereby precluding the
application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in this matter. . . . [because
Images' fraudulent inducement claim in the
Affinity Arbitration had been dismissed] at
the summary judgment stage, before any
testimony was allowed . . . .
(R. 1200-1201.)
Images did not argue to the trial court that the
fraudulent inducement issues in the Affinity Arbitration were
different than the fraudulent inducement issues in the MScA
Litigation as it does now on this appeal.

In fact, as

demonstrated above, Images had repeatedly contended that the same
alleged misrepresentations by Macris had induced it to enter into
both the Affinity Contract and the M&A Contract.
Based upon the-record and arguments before it, the
trial court rejected Images' argument against collateral
estoppel, properly holding that "[c]ollateral estoppel applies to
issues decided on summary judgment;" and "to issues decided in
arbitration proceedings."

(R. 1233.)

The trial court then

Images next argued that M&A's collateral estoppel
argument was premature because (as noted in the text above)
Images had filed a Motion for Modification in the Affinity
Arbitration, asking the arbitrator to modify his Order of
Dismissal in such a way that Images would not be collaterally
estopped from relitigating tne issue of fraudulent inducement.
(R. 1201-1203.) This argument, however, was completely mooted
when the arbitrator denied Images' Motion for Modification, as
discussed in the text above. Images does not pursue its
"prematurity" argument on this appeal.
39560
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g r ai i t e d M&A' s n L :)t::i : i i f 01 si n i: LI i tai : \

j udg n lei i t a s t: : • It i l a g e s •

fraudulent inducement counterclaim, finding that
the prior judgment against the Defendants on
the issue of whether Mr. Maoris,, whether
acting as an agent for Macris & Associates,
Inc. or Affinity, Inc., fraudulently induced
Images & Attitude, Inc. need not be relitigated in this action, . . . The issue as
to whether Mr. Macris fraudulently induced
the Defendants has already been fully and
fairly litigated in a prior arbitration
proceeding. . . . The prior arbitration
proceeding found that no fraudulent
inducement had occurred.
(Id.)
T h e t: r :i a 3; • : i i t: h e i e m a i i 1 i n g :i s s i i e s w a s h e ] d £ r o m
F e b r u a r y 16, 1996 to M a r c h 2 7 , 1 996.

Durii ig the t r i a l , t h e lower

court issued a n o r d e r that W i l l i a m C r i s m o n a n d o t h e r s woul d n o t
b e a 11 o w e d t c • t e s t :i f y b e c a u s e I m ai g e s 1 i a d f a i I e d t: • : i :I e i I t: ;i f y I: :i :i i: i: i
and s i x o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s as w i t n e s s e s until a m o n t h a f t e r
d i s c o v e r y had. closed even t h o u g h the i n t e r r o g a t o r y

requesting

s u c I i i d e i 111 f i c a t: i • :D I :i I I a d ] o i i g b e e i I p r e \ i o u s ] y p i o p o \ i n d e d, t: 1: i e
court h a d o r d e r e d such list to b e s u p p l e m e n t e d , Images p r e v i o u s l y
had s u p p l e m e n t e d i t s wit ne ss 1is t w i t hout i dent i f y i n g Cri smon a n d
the o 11 I e r s :i x :i i i d i1; i :I u a 1 s a s w i t: i I esse s ; I rn a g e s k n e w o £ C r i s m o n ' s
e x i s t e n c e a n d intended to call h i m as a w i t n e s s . ' D e s p i t e its
p r i o r r u l i n g , the lower court later a l l o w e d two of the three

:

' Images v o l u n t a r i l y d r o p p e d three w i t n e s s e s w h e n its
s l a n d e r c l a i m s were d i s m i s s e d , a n d the court a l l o w e d o n e w i t n e s s
to be called.
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previously excluded witnesses to provide testimony on rebuttal.
Absent from the record is any indication that Images made a
proffer as to what William Crismon's testimony would have been or
why it was otherwise important for him to testify.
After hearing the testimony, reviewing the exhibits,
and considering proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
from both parties, the trial court issued its Memorandum Opinion
and subsequently entered Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
and a Judgment9 in favor of M&A.

The trial court held in favor

of M&A in all respects that M&A performed its obligations under
the M&A Contract and against Images on the counterclaim and
third-party complaint holding that M&A did not breach the M&A
Contract in any manner alleged by Images.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Images has raised three principal issues on appeal.
Only one of Images' arguments was properly preserved for appeal
before the lower court, and none of the contentions has merit,
either legally or factually.
The trial court's ruling that Images is barred from
asserting fraudulent inducement claims because of collateral
estoppel or issue preclusion should be affirmed for a number of
reasons.

First, Images never argued to the trial court that the

fraudulent inducement issues in the Affinity Arbitration were

9
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different than those in the M&A Litigation and has thus waived
that objection.

Second, contrary to the contentions now made on

appeal, Images has repeatedly and consistently contended that the
same misrepresentations induced it to enter into both the
Affinity Contract and the M&A Contract; thus, Images had the
opportunity to fully litigate all claims of fraudulent
inducement.

Third, the arbitrator decided that there were no

material misrepresentations upon which Images reasonably relied.
Fourth, the "big hitter" representation, which was not timely
presented to the lower court, cannot even be the basis of a fraud
claim.

Fifth, Images does not contend that it was denied the

opportunity to present affidavits or arguments to the arbitrator
prior to his ruling on Affinity's motion for summary judgment on
the fraudulent inducement issue.

Thus, Images had a full, fair

and complete opportunity to present its arguments regarding
fraudulent inducement and is now collaterally estopped from
raising the fraudulent inducement issue against M&A.
The trial court's findings that Macris was not acting
as the agent of M&A when he started another network marketing
company, Emily Rose, Inc., or engaged in other unspecified acts
and/or that M&A was not the "alter ego" of Macris should be
affirmed.

In challenging those findings, Images fails to marshal

the substantial evidence supporting the trial court's rulings.
Moreover, Images' arguments ignore other unchallenged findings
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which render the alter ego/agency question moot, i.e. that Images
materially breached its contract with M&A and that because of
that prior material breach, Macris, M&A, Emily Rose, Inc. or any
other entity with which Macris may have been associated was free
to compete directly with Images.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding the testimony of William Crismon.

The record is

clear that Crismon, as well as six other witnesses, were
precluded from testifying at trial as a discovery sanction
resulting from Images' failure to identify them in response to a
court order until a month after the discovery cut-off date.
Despite that ruling, the trial court later allowed at least three
of the four remaining witnesses to testify on rebuttal.

There is

nothing in the record indicating that Images' proffered William
Crismon's testimony to the lower court or explained why his
testimony would add anything to the testimony of Thomas Crismon,
his brother and business partner, who did provide testimony.
For these reasons, as more fully addressed herein, the
trial court's rulings should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO DISMISS IMAGES' FRAUDULENT
INDUCEMENT COUNTERCLAIM
A

The "Correctness" Standard Of Review Only Applies
To Matters Properly Before This Court

Images contends that the trial court's summary judgment
finding should be reviewed under "a correctness standard," and
that "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom"
should be viewed "in the light most favorable to" Images.
Appellant's Brief at 14.

However, the "correctness standard"

applies only to those issues which Images properly raised before
the trial court

Images may not ask this Court to reverse the

trial court on the basis of an issue raised for the first time on
appeal.

See Rocky Mt

Thrift v

Salt Lake City Corp , 887 P.2d

848, 850 (Utah 1994) (refusing to consider new negligence
theories which "were not raised before the trial court and may
not now be raised"), Cowen and Co

v

Atlas Stock Transfer Co ,

695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984) (on an appeal from summary
judgment, the appellant may not "raise issues that were not
raised to the trial court and proffer facts to support those
issues on appeal").

Likewise, the "all reasonable inferences"

standard applies only to those facts which were properly in the
record before the trial court at the time it ruled on the
collateral estoppel issue.

Govert Copier Painting v

Leeuwen, 801 P 2d 163, 170 (Utah App

J35O0
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Van

1990) ("We will not

consider facts on appeal when there is no record the trial judge
had access to those facts when deciding the motion at issue.");
Seare v. University of Utah School of Medicine, 882 P.2d 673, 676
n.4 (Utah App. 1994) (M[I]n reviewing an order granting summary
judgment 'we consider only the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits properly
before the trial judge.'") (citation omitted).
As demonstrated below, only one of Images' three
arguments regarding collateral estoppel was ever raised with the
trial court, and thereby properly preserved for appeal; that
argument, however, lacks any legal merit.

Images' remaining two

arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, are predicated
on facts that were not part of the record before the trial court,
and ignore the law of collateral estoppel.
13*

Images Is Barred From Raising Arguments On Appeal
Which It Failed To Present To The Lower Court.

Images now asserts that there were two fraudulent
misrepresentations inducing the M&A Contract which were different
from the fraudulent inducement claims in the Affinity
Arbitration:

(1) the National Enquirer advertising and (2) some

vague references to Macris' "ability to bring in 'big hitters.'"
See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at p. 11.

Thus, Images argues that

the trial court erred in applying collateral estoppel.
Appellant's Brief at pp. 17-19, 21-22.

See

Images, however, never

raised this argument in any pleading, in any affidavit, or in any
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interrogatory answer.

Most importantly, in its opposition papers

to M&A's argument that the fraudulent inducement claim was barred
by collateral estoppel, Images never advised the lower court that
the fraudulent inducement issues were allegedly different.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Images has violated Utah
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by not
citing where in the record this alleged error was preserved.
1.

Images may not question, for the first time
on this appeal, whether or not the alleged
fraudulent inducement issues in the two
proceedings were identical.

By failing to give the trial court the opportunity to
rule on the question of whether the fraudulent inducement issues
were the same in the Affinity Arbitration and the M&A Litigation,
Images failed to preserve it for appeal.

See Rocky Mt., 887 P.2d

at 850 (issues not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal); Cowen, 695 P.2d 109 at 113-14 (Utah 1984)
(appellant from summary judgment may not "raise issues that were
not raised to the trial court and proffer facts to support those
issues on appeal")/ see also Aldrich and Steinberger v. Martin,
837 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1992) (The fact that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel was before the trial court "does
not preserve for review any and all aspects of [that] doctrine[]
that [the appellant] chooses to raise on appeal.

Only the theory

expressly raised, that of privity, was properly preserved for
appeal.")/ Delisle v. Avallone, 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (N.M. App.
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1994) (Because party against whom collateral estoppel was
asserted "did not claim absence of a full and fair opportunity,
the issue was not preserved in the proceedings below," and could
not be argued on appeal.).
Therefore, even if there were any merit to Images'
argument regarding whether or not the fraudulent inducement
issues in the two proceedings were different (and as demonstrated
below, there is no merit to Images' argument), Images may not
seek to have the trial court reversed on the basis of such an
argument raised for the first time on appeal.
2.

Images may not seek to have the trial court
reversed on the basis of newly asserted facts
which were either absent from, or directly
contradictory to, the record before the trial
court.

Images also attempts to support its argument by
asserting facts to this Court which were not before the lower
court at the time it granted summary judgment dismissing the
fraudulent inducement claims.

Images attempts to create the

illusion of two differences between the fraudulent inducement
issues in the two proceedings.

First, it asserts that the

alleged "big hitter" misrepresentation was at issue in the M&A
Litigation, but not in the Affinity Arbitration.

However,

Images' allegation that Macris had made the "big hitter"
statement did not appear in the case below until long after the
trial court had already ruled on M&A's collateral estoppel
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summary judgment motion.

"[T]here is no record the trial judge

had access to [this alleged fact] when deciding the motion at
issue," and Images may not ask this Court to reverse the trial
court on the basis of an untimely disclosed "fact."

See Govert

Copier Painting, 801 P.2d at 170.
Second, Images asserts that Macris' supposed
representation regarding advertising in the National Enquirer was
not made until after the Affinity Contract had been executed, and
that this alleged representation was not at issue in the Affinity
Arbitration, but only in the MScA Litigation.
at 7, 11, 15, 17, and 21.
contradicts

Appellant's Brief

However, this assertion actually

the record before the lower court and cited above,

where Images repeatedly contended that the alleged representation
regarding advertising in.the National Enquirer was made prior to
the execution of either contract, and was an inducement to both.
Because this Court "consider[s] only the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits properly
before the trial judge" when reviewing the trial court's entry of
summary judgment, see Seare, 882 P.2d at 676 n.4, Images clearly
cannot argue for reversal based upon facts absent from and
contradictory to the record before the trial court.
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3.

Images may not rely upon a newly alleged "big
hitters" misrepresentation as a grounds for
fraudulent inducement.

Images' "big hitter" contention should be rejected as
being untimely presented.

Even if it had been timely presented

to the lower court, however, any such vague and indefinite claim
should have been dismissed because it cannot, as a matter of law,
support a claim for fraud.

It is axiomatic that fraud requires a

representation concerning a presently existing fact.
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980).

See Dugan

A claim of fraud

cannot be predicated upon expressions of opinion, unfulfilled
predictions or expectations or erroneous conjectures as to future
events.10

See Aloha Petroglyph v. Baldwin, Inc., 619 P.2d 518,

519 (Ha. App. 1980); Hall v. Romero, 685 P.2d 757, 760 (Ariz.
App. 1984).
As a matter of law, a statement that Macris intended to
bring in "big hitters" is not an expression of a presently
existing fact which can support Images' fraudulent inducement
claims, and is simply too vague a representation upon which

10

In fact, Macris did bring in "big hitters" as he
represented, including Margie Hunsaker, Glenn Tillotson and the
Camerons. The Hunsaker distributorship was the biggest and most
successful downline organization among Images' distributors. See
Findings at 11, 12, 13, 14 & 17.
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Images could reasonably have relied.11

Images' "big hitter"

contention should be rejected.
4.

Collateral estoppel bars Images from
relitigating- the fraudulent inducement issue.

As noted above, Images has always contended that
Macris' alleged misrepresentations regarding Dr. Lyman's
involvement with the nail systems and National Enquirer
advertising induced it to enter into both the Affinity Contract
and the M&A Contract.

It now asserts, however, that the

fraudulent inducement issue litigated in the Affinity Arbitration
was different from the fraudulent inducement issue below in two
respects.

Images argues that in the Affinity Arbitration,
the issue was whether Images was fraudulently
induced by virtue of the [alleged]
misrepresentation into entering into the
Affinity [C]ontract . . . .
In the instant
case, however, the issue to be litigated was
whether Images was fraudulently induced into
entering the Macris & Associates [Contract].

Appellant's Brief at 18.12
11

Although M&A's argument on this point was not made
previously because of the lateness in which Images has asserted
its "big hitters" argument, this Court may properly consider it.
An appellate court may affirm the trial court on any proper
grounds, including grounds argued for the first time on appeal.
See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah
1988) .
12

A diligent search of the record in this matter, reveals
(a) no source document which can be reviewed to determine what
precise misrepresentation claims may have been alleged in any
pleading in the Affinity Arbitration; (b) no amendments to any
such pleadings; (c) no deposition transcripts; (d) no transcripts
of arguments, etc. In short, Images presented nothing to the
33560
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This language is phrased so broadly as to gloss over
the required analysis.

Images' causes of action in the two

proceedings were of course different, but they shared a common
constituent factual issue:

whether Macris made any material

misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing Images' reliance.
The arbitrator in the Affinity Arbitration resolved that issue
against Images by ruling that Macris had "made no
misrepresentations of material facts to [Images] to induce
[Images] to enter into the" Affinity Agreement.13

(R. 1197.)

The trial court correctly held that this prior judgment
collaterally estopped Images from relitigating this common issue,
even in the context of a different cause of action.

See Searle

Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978) (collateral
estoppel prevents relitigation of issues resolved in a previous
suit even though the first suit involved "a different cause of
action").

lower court which supports its current contentions that the
fraudulent misrepresentation issues were actually different in
the two proceedings.
13

On appeal, Images criticizes the arbitrator's ruling by
arguing that the ruling is unclear as to whether there were any
representations, whether they were false, whether they were
immaterial, or to which representations the arbitrator was
referring. Appellate Brief at 18. Frankly, it makes no
difference. If there was no misrepresentation, or a
misrepresentation was immaterial, or if Images did not reasonably
rely on any alleged misrepresentation as the arbitrator so held,
there is no basis for a claim of fraudulent inducement.
33560

24

Even if the Court were to accept the factual premise of
Images' argument (for the sake of argument only), and assume that
in the Affinity Arbitration Images failed to introduce some of
the misrepresentations which it now alleges against Macris, that
failure would not give Images license to relitigate the issue of
fraudulent inducement.

This is because, as a matter of law,

collateral estoppel applies to "ultimate issues" such as
fraudulent inducement, and not to mere "evidentiary facts" such
as the particular representations which might be alleged in an
attempt to establish fraudulent inducement.

Therefore, because

Images "did in fact litigate an issue of ultimate fact and
suffered an adverse determination, new evidentiary facts may not
be brought forward to obtain a different determination of that
ultimate fact."

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment c

(1982) .
The distinction between "ultimate issues" and
"evidentiary facts" is illustrated in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments as follows:
A brings an action against B to recover
for personal injuries in an automobile
accident. A seeks to establish that B was
negligent in driving at an excessive rate of
speed. After trial, verdict and judgment are
given for B. In a subsequent action by B
against A for injuries in the same accident,
A is precluded from setting up B's negligence
as a defense, whether or not the alleged
negligence is based on an assertion of
excessive speed. It is reasonable to require
A to bring forward all evidence in support of
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the alleged negligence in the initial
proceeding.
Id. illustration 4.

The "ultimate issue" in this illustration is

B's alleged negligence.
into pieces.

Ultimate issues "may not be split . . .

If it has been determined in a former action, it is

binding notwithstanding the parties litigant may have neglected
to urge for or against it matters which, if urged, would have
produced an opposite result."

IB James W. Moore, Moore's Federal

Practice H 0.443[2] at III. -566 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting Price v.
Sixth District, 258 P. 387 (Cal. 1927)).

Thus, once an ultimate

issue -- such as negligence or fraudulent inducement -- has been
litigated to a final judgment, collateral estoppel precludes the
losing party from relitigating the issue in a subsequent
proceeding, even if there are additional evidentiary facts which
might yield a different determination of the ultimate issue, but
which the losing party failed to introduce in the initial
proceeding.
This principle was applied in In re Transocean Tender
Offer Securities Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D.Ill. 1977).
The plaintiffs in that case were minority shareholders who, in a
prior state court action, had asserted state law claims that the
majority shareholder failed to make "full disclosure" of all
relevant facts surrounding a tender offer.

427 F. Supp. at 1220,

The state court found that the majority shareholder had satisfied
its "full disclosure" obligation, and entered final judgment
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dismissing the plaintiffs' state law claims.

JEd. at 1214, 1220.

In the subsequent federal action in Transocean, the
plaintiffs asserted additional evidentiary facts which had not
been considered in the prior state court action, and on the basis
of those new evidentiary facts claimed that the offering circular
contained misstatements and omissions of material fact.
1218.

Ld. at

The federal court ruled that both proceedings presented

the same ultimate issue of "full disclosure," and that the
plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from relitigating that
issue, even on the basis of new evidentiary facts.

Id. at 1222-

23 :
Having litigated the ultimate issue of full
disclosure and suffered an adverse
determination, new evidentiary facts may not
be brought forward to obtain a different
determination of that ultimate fact.
Id. at 1222.
The principle was even more dramatically applied in
Yamaha Corp. of America v. U.S., 961 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
The plaintiff in that case, "Yamaha-America," was the exclusively
authorized distributor of "Yamaha" brand products within the
United States, and the exclusive owner of several U.S. trademarks
for Yamaha products.

961 F.2d at 248.

In a prior action,

Yamaha-America had brought a claim against an importer of "graymarket" Yamaha products, i.e., genuine Yamaha products which had
been manufactured and sold abroad, but were then imported into
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the United States without the consent of Yamaha-America.

Id.

Yamaha-America claimed that because these gray-market imports
bore "Yamaha" trademarks, they violated section 42 of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, which prohibits the importation of goods
which "copy or simulate" a U.S. trademark.

Ld. at 250.

In the

prior action, the court dismissed Yamaha-America's claim on the
ground that the gray-market goods were not mere copies or
simulations within the meaning of the Lanham Act, but were
"genuine Yamaha items," and that Yamaha-America therefore had no
cause of action under section 42.

Id. at 250-51.

In a subsequent action on an unrelated matter (i.e.
challenging a federal regulation) Yamaha-America argued an
evidentiary fact which it had neglected to introduce in the
initial proceeding.

that the gray-market products were

physically different in various respects from the Yamaha products
sold by Yamaha-America

Ld

at 253

The District Court noted

that this new evidentiary fact might well have compelled a
judgment in Yamaha-America's favor in the subsequent action
at 258.

Id.

However, the court held that "[O]nee an issue is raised

and determined, it is the entire issue

that is precluded, not

just the particular arguments raised in support of it in the
first case

.

Preclusion cannot be avoided simply by

offering evidence in the second proceeding that could have been
admitted, but was not, in the first "
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Id. at 254-55 (emphasis in

original).

Therefore, because "Yamaha-America failed properly to

introduce evidence of 'physical differences' in the [initial
proceeding], . . .

it is precluded from relitigating the issue of

its rights under section 42 based on this 'new' evidence."
Id. at 258.

See also Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp.,

496 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1974) (ultimate issue of the
lawfulness of a license agreement had been litigated in a
previous action, and the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from
relitigating that issue, even on the basis of new factual
allegations had not been considered in the previous litigation);
Temple of the Lost Sheep Inc. v. Abrams, 930 F.2d 178, 184-85 (2d
Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs collaterally estopped from relitigating
conspiracy issue decided against them in prior action, despite
plaintiffs' contention that adverse judgment in prior action was
based upon inadequate record); Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d
131, 136 (10th Cir. 1972) ("If the taxpayer's case was not
effectively presented at the first trial it was their fault;
affording them a second opportunity in which to litigate the
matter, with the benefit of hindsight, would contravene the very
principles upon which collateral estoppel is based.").
In the instant case, the ultimate "issue" which was
litigated to a final judgment in the Affinity Arbitration was
whether Macris had made any "misrepresentations of material fact
to [Images] to induce [Images] to enter into an agreement with
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Images or upon which Images reasonably relied.

(R. 1197.)

In

accordance with the principles discussed above, Images cannot
avoid the collateral estoppel effect of the arbitrator's final
judgment simply by asserting that there are additional
evidentiary facts (i.e., additional specific alleged
representations) which bear on the ultimate issue of fraudulent
inducement, but which it failed to advance in the Affinity
Arbitration.
B.

Images' Allegations Of Fraudulent Inducement Were
Competently, Fully, And Fairly Litigated In The
Affinity Arbitration.

Images argues that because its fraudulent inducement
claim in the Affinity Arbitration was dismissed on Affinity's
motion for summary judgment, the claim "was not afforded a
competent, full and fair -litigation."

Appellant's Brief at 19.

This is the only collateral estoppel argument which Images ever
raised before the trial court, and thereby properly preserved for
this appeal.

Images, however, does not contend, much less does

it cite to any portion of the record to show that it was
prevented from filing affidavits in opposition to Affinity's
summary judgment motion in the Affinity Arbitration, nor that it
was not allowed to present any argument it desired, nor that
there was any other particular deficiency in the presentation or
argument of that summary judgment motion.

Rather, Images bases

its argument on the simple proposition that because summary
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judgment is, by its very nature, resolved without an "evidentiary
hearing," Appellant's Brief at 19-20, it is per

se inadequate to

support collateral estoppel.
This is a novel and unsound theory.

The clear rule is

that final judgment pursuant to a motion for summary judgment is
given the same collateral estoppel effect as final judgment
following a trial.

See Dicken v. Ashcroft, 972 F.2d 231, 233 n.

5 (8th Cir. 1992) ("It is well established that summary judgment
is a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res
judicata.");

Carpenter v. Young, 773 P.2d 561, 568 (Colo. 1989)

(summary judgment accorded collateral estoppel effect); Creed
Tavlor, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) ("Issues decided upon a motion for summary judgment may be
accorded the same preclusive effect as issues decided following a
trial."); Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4444, at 391-92 (1981) ("Both claim preclusion and issue
preclusion result from summary judgments that rest on the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact going to the merits of claim
or defense."); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. d,
illus. 10 (1982) (final judgment on a motion for summary judgment
in a prior proceeding is given collateral estoppel effect).14

14

See also James L. Saohier Agency, Inc. v. Green, 190 F.
Supp. 713, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("A decision by arbitrators is as
binding and conclusive under the doctrine of res judicata and
estoppel as the judgment of a court.").
39560

31

Therefore, the trial court correctly held that, as a result of
the final judgment dismissing Images' fraudulent inducement claim
in the Affinity Arbitration, Images was collaterally estopped
from relitigating that issue below.
The only authority which Images cites in support of its
argument on appeal is Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) . That case, however, never
mentions collateral estoppel, and does not discuss whether
summary judgment is "competent, full and fair litigation11 for
purposes of collateral estoppel.

Rather, the plaintiffs in that

case claimed to have been injured by Salt Lake City Corporation's
flood-control activities.

784 P.2d at 459.

The trial court

granted summary judgment to the city on the ground that all of
the city's flood-control•activities were protected by
governmental immunity.

784 P.2d at 460.

The Utah Supreme Court

reversed in part, holding that governmental immunity extends only
to the city's "policy" decisions regarding "the design, capacity,
and construction of" its flood control system, but not to "the
operation and maintenance" of the system.

784 P.2d at 463-64.

The Utah Supreme Court then held that because the trial court
decided the case "on a motion for summary judgment, no full and
adequate evidentiary hearing was held to resolve critical facts"
regarding whether the challenged flood-control activities were
immune "policy" decisions, or actionable "operational" decisions.
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784 P.2d at 464.

The court remanded the case to the trial court

for fact-finding on this question.

Jd.

Thus, Rocky Mountain

held only that the summary judgment hearing in that case had not
"resolve[d] critical facts" necessary to determine the proper
scope of governmental immunity.

Xd.

In no way does the case

support Images' assertion that summary judgment is somehow per

se

inadequate to support collateral estoppel.
Thus, as to the first issue on appeal, Images failed to
demonstrate that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to
address the fraudulent inducement issue in the Affinity
Arbitration.

Its current attack on the collateral estoppel

summary judgment is "too little, too late."

It failed to make

appropriate and necessary arguments when it had the opportunity
and obligation to do so .(assuming that there were any actual
grounds for making such claims).

It has failed to create a

proper record and has misstated the record.

It relies upon

matters never presented to the lower court.

Finally, it relies

upon a misrepresentation which, as a matter of law, cannot
support a claim of fraud.

For all these reasons, the lower

court's dismissal of Images' fraudulent inducement claims on the
grounds of collateral estoppel should be affirmed.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE ACTIONS OF MACRIS
WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MACRIS & ASSOCIATES AND THAT
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES IS NOT MAORIS' ALTER EGO SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED
A.

Images' Claims Should Be Rejected Because It Has
Failed To Marshal All The Evidence Supporting The
Trial Court's Findings.

Images has failed in its burden on appeal to marshal
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's alleged
erroneous findings.

Images contests twelve of the trial court's

fifty-eight findings of fact.

To support those findings, Images

provides only eight citations to the record which it concludes
are mainly the self-serving testimony of Macris,15 see Appellate
Brief at 26, but ignores numerous others.
The challenging party must marshal all relevant
evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings
and then demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous.
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah
App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989).
Where an appellant has failed to adequately marshal this
evidence, the trial court's findings must be affirmed.

Grahn v.

Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1990); Turnbaugh v. Anderson,
793 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 1990).

15

Of course, the trial court was free to believe Macris'
and others' "self-serving" testimony over that of Images'
witnesses.
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Appellants must begin by undertaking an arduous and
painstaking marshalling process, and after marshalling all of the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, appellants must
then demonstrate that these same findings are "so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence," thus,
making them clearly erroneous.

Mountain States Broadcasting Co.

v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989).

As explained in

West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.:
[T]he marshalling concept does not reflect a
desire to merely have pertinent excerpts from
the record readily available to a reviewing
court. The marshalling process is not unlike
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must
extricate himself or herself from the
client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly
discharge the duty of marshalling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports
the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must
be sufficient to convince the appellate court
that the court's findings resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous. (Emphasis
added.)
818 P.2d at 1315.
Since one of Images' principle complaints is that the
trial court had no valid evidence to find that M&A was not the
alter ego of Macris, the following summary of evidence will
demonstrate Images' failure to marshal evidence in support of the
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trial court's findings that M&A was legally separate and distinct
from Macris, Affinity, or other corporations with which Macris
was affiliated:

38560

1.

Tom Mower, President of Images, Inc., in June,
1989, signed the first contract to provide a nail
and gel system with Affinity, Inc., a Utah
corporation, with Mike Macris acting as Affinity's
president. (R. 5166.)

2.

In August, 198 9, Tom Mower signed the
Distributorship Agreements and the autoqualification addendum with Macris & Associates,
Inc., a Utah corporation with Mike Macris signing
as secretary.
(Trial Exhibits 1 & 2.)

3.

In order to clarify internal records of Images,
Inc., Tom Mower added "Inc." to Macris &
Associates in order to insure that Macris &
Associates' corporate formalities were observed
and to correct Images' records. (R. 5459, 4670.)

4.

Tom Mower, at all relevant times in this
litigation, was himself the principal officer and
director of at least three separate corporations
and knew of the significance of dealing with
separate corporate entities. (R. 5460.)

5.

Tom Mower knowingly dealt with Affinity, Inc., and
Macris & Associates, Inc., and never asked to see
corporate documents or never questioned the
separateness of each entity.
(R. 5457-58.)

6.

Trial Exhibit 34 - the first downline report came in the name of Macris & Associates, Inc., as
did all ensuing monthly reports.

7.

During 1990, Tom Mower sent letters related to gel
testing to Affinity, Inc., attention Michael
Macris, demonstrating Mower's awareness of
Affinity's separateness from Macris & Associates,
Inc. (R. 884-888 and Trial Ex. 55.)

8.

Plaintiff demonstrated that it held corporate
meetings, took minutes, filed separate tax

36

returns, kept separate checking accounts.
Trial Exhs. 88, 89/ R. 4668.)

(See

9.

Valerie Macris testified that she, not Mike
Macris, became the sole shareholder, kept minutes,
ratified contracts and kept separate accounts and
filed separate tax returns for Macris &
Associates, Inc. (See Trial Exhs. 40, 42/ R.
5121.)

10.

Others testified that they knew Mike Macris
operated his distributorship through Macris &
Associates, Inc., and separated his other
companies and their duties. (See, e.g., Marge
Aliparandi testimony, R. 4745.)

All of the above is more than sufficient for the Court
to base its findings that M&A is legitimately a separate
corporate entity whose corporate veil need not be pierced and
that Macris legitimately operated other businesses without
creating any undisclosed "fraud" or "inequity" upon Images.
Instead of marshalling evidence in favor of the court's
findings, Images' simply re-argues allegations and innuendo in
support of its position which allegations were soundly rejected
by the trial court after presentation of extensive evidence.
B.

Images' Assumption That Macris Engaged In
"Disruptive, Competitive Activity" Is Incorrect.

Images argues that MScA somehow breached the M&A
Contract because of Macris' activities on behalf of other
companies.

Images relies upon unsubstantiated assumptions that

what Macris did as an agent for one company (Emily Rose or
Affinity) should be attributable to M&A as "disruptive and
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competitive" behavior, thus, supplying Images with an excuse for
terminating the M&A Contract.16

That tortured, complex and

irrational argument also assumes that all of the alleged
competitive conduct was illegal, disruptive and created a
legitimate cause for termination of the M&A Contract.
In fact, however, the trial court made the following
Findings that are unchallenged by Appellants:
42.

The reasons given by Defendant for terminating
Plaintiff after already terminating Plaintiff's
auto qualification status and failing to pay
Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, were all
pre-textual and without merit, and did not justify
termination of Plaintiff. (R. 3051.)

47.

Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and
wrongfully terminated Plaintiff's addendum. (R.
3049. )

50.

Following Defendant's breach of the contract,
neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant,
Macris, was contractually restricted from
competing with the Defendant. (R. 3049.)

54.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to
establish that any contracts or potential
contracts with Defendant were breached as a result
of either Plaintiff's or Macris' alleged actions.
(R. 3048.)

55.

There was no adequate or credible evidence to
establish that either Plaintiff or Macris engaged
in any activities for the purpose of wrongfully
interfering with Defendant's existing or potential
contractual relations. (R. 3048.)

16

Macris' relationship with Affinity was known to Images
through, among other things, Affinity's separate contract to
supply Images with nail gel and ultraviolet lamp housings.
Macris' relationship with Emily Rose, Inc. did not commence until
after Images materially breached the M<kA Contract.
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See also Findings 51, 52, 53, 56 6c 58; and Memorandum Decision,
HH 49, 50, 51, 52 Sc 56 wherein the trial court found that none of
the so-called competitive or disruptive activities took place or
were improper.

Similarly, none of the alleged competitive

activity has been shown in Appellant's Brief or at trial to be in
any way improper.
Plaintiff does not intend to fulfill Appellants' burden
of properly marshalling the evidence on each of the twelve
Findings at issue.

It is more than sufficient that the lower

court had voluminous evidence supporting each and every one of
the contested findings, including hundreds of pages of testimony,
exhibits and all inferences which were drawn therefrom.
C.

The Trial Court's Conclusion That Maoris &
Associates Is Not The Alter E Q O Of Macris Is
Correct.

Images relies upon Utah law allowing the court to
pierce a corporate veil in order to hold a shareholder personally
liable if it can be determined that the corporation is the alter
ego of one or a few individuals, and if observed, the corporate
form would sanction "a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an
inequity."

Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah

App. 1994).

Yet, once again, Images engages in assumptions and

presumptions not found in this record.
Images presumes that whatever conduct Macris engaged
in, either through his various legal corporate entities or
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individually, constituted a "fraud or an injustice."

Nowhere,

however, does Images suggest what that fraud is or the nature of
the injustice.

Images appeals the trial court's finding that M&A

is not the alter ego of Macris, individually.

Images is not

attempting to pierce a corporate veil in order to collect a
judgment against Macris, nor does it suggest how a fraud is being
perpetrated by the observance of a separate legal entity.
Corporations are generally regarded as separate and
distinct from its shareholders.

Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d

370, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973).
corporation only has one stockholder.

This is true even when the
Coleman v. Coleman, 743

P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987) . The corporate veil, which protects
shareholders from individual liability for corporate debt will
only be pierced reluctantly and cautiously.

Ramsey v. Adams, 603

P.2d 1025 (Kan. App. 1979).
Images incorrectly assumes that Macris, the individual,
is the alter ego of each and every one of his corporations, and,
accordingly, each corporate act becomes the corporate and
individual act of every other corporation with which Macris is
associated.

The general rule is that separate corporations are

separate legal entities and this is not destroyed by simple
common ownership.

Institutional Laundry v. Utah State Tax Comm.,

706 P.2d 1066 (Utah 1985).
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Unless some conspiracy has been alleged, and none has,
courts do not attribute one person's actions with every other
entity in the world with which it is associated.

For these

reasons alone, Images' arguments must fail.
D.

Images May Not Complain Of Any Alleged Competitive
Activity By Macris Or M&A Because Images
Materially Breached The M&A Contract.

Cutting through all of Images' painful efforts to
create an applicable issue regarding Macris' agency status or the
alter ego status of his companies is Finding No. 50.

That

unchallenged finding renders Images' alter ego/agency arguments
moot.

Even if Macris was the agent of Affinity and/or Emily Rose

and even if he engaged in competitive conduct, he, M&A, Emily
Rose or any other company with which he was associated was free
to compete with Images. -As stated in Finding No. 50:

"Following

Defendant's breach of the contract, neither Plaintiff nor ThirdParty Defendant Macris was contractually restricted from
competing with the Defendant."
Because Images fails to marshal the evidence supporting
the trial court's findings regarding Macris agency/alter ego
questions, fails to show any improper activity and fails to
appeal the trial court's Finding No. 50 which renders such
questions moot, the trial court's Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment should be affirmed.
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III.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A
MOTION IN LIMINE REGARDING WILLIAM CRISMON
M&A filed a Motion in Limine to exclude seven witnesses

from testifying at trial who had not been named as witnesses by
the discovery cut off date, December 1, 1994, as ordered by the
trial court.

M&A relied upon Rule 37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure which provides that a court may make such
orders in regard to a party's failure to abide by discovery
orders, including a refusal to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or prohibiting him from
introducing designated matters into evidence.
Images relies upon Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad, 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992) for the
proposition that absent an order compelling responses to
discovery, the trial court abuses its discretion in granting a
motion to exclude witnesses from testifying at trial.

The

procedural facts are clearly distinguishable in this matter from
Berrett, because the court had issued a discovery order and also
because the trial judge changed its original ruling.
On June 2, 1993, M&A served its Third Set of
Interrogatories on Defendants requesting an identification of
witnesses to be called at trial.

Images responded that it had

not yet determined who would be called at trial.

On August 10,

1994, in preparation for a September 6, 1994 trial, Images
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supplemented its answer to the Third Set of Interrogatories to
include their trial witness list.
Due to a conflict with the lower court's schedule,
trial was continued and discovery was re-opened by order of the
court until December 1, 1994.

(See Court Order, R. 2621-2622,

copy attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 4.)

Thereafter, on

September 13, 1994, Images' witness list was again supplemented,
but failed to identify William Crismon as a trial witness.
On January 11, 1994, more than one month after the
Court ordered discovery cut-off, Images served a new supplemented
response which added seven new fact witnesses to be called at
trial.
A.

Defendants' Supplemental Witness List Violated The
Court Order.

Plaintiff had experienced significant difficulty in
obtaining answers to legitimate discovery requests.17

Previous

motions to compel discovery had been filed, argued and
subsequently granted.

Aware of this history, the trial court

issued its Order dated September 16, 1994 that Images supply a
witness list by that date and that additional discovery would be
cut-off as of December 1, 1994.

(R. at 2621.)

17

See Motion to Compel dated December 14, 1991 (R. 25622564); Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Order
Compelling Discovery dated July 8, 1992, Motion in Limine dated
August 26, 1994 and Motion in Limine dated February 1, 1995 (R.
at 2608).
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Of the seven new witnesses, Images voluntarily withdrew
three names.

After full argument, the trial court granted M&A's

motion as to Tom and William Crismon and Susan Franceschi, but
denied the motion as to David Floor.

(R. 4940.)

Clearly, the trial court retains broad discretion in
the management of its trials, and proceedings.
Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994).

Shepherd v.
While the

exclusion of evidence and witnesses is a harsh remedy, it is one
that, under proper circumstances, can be used to sanction noncomplying parties and control case management.

The trial court

premised its rulings upon Images' admission that Images knew of
the existence of some witnesses well before the discovery cut-off
date, had taken their depositions (see R. 4939), and yet failed
to timely inform M&A of its intention to use these witnesses at
trial.
B.

Any Exclusion Of William Crismon's Testimony Was
Not Error.

Images stipulated that it did not intend to use those
witnesses for any purpose other than as already disclosed in
discovery depositions (R. at 4935).

Images did not, however,

proffer the nature or need for such evidence to the trial judge
who could have exercised an opportunity to weigh the nature and
necessity of the testimony.

This is in stark contrast to other

occasions in which proffers had been made to the trial court.
(See, e.g., R. 5591-96.)
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Between the trial court's ruling on February 21, 1995
and the last day of trial, March 27, 1995, the trial court
apparently changed its rulings and allowed rebuttal testimony
from two of the three witnesses it had earlier excluded:

Susan

Franceschi and Tom Crismon (R. 5623-5628), the latter, through
his deposition testimony taken on March 23, 1995.
Impliedly, the testimony of William Crismon would have
been cumulative and no different than that of his brother, Tom
Crismon, with whom he purportedly entered into a preincorporation agreement with Macris on April 9, 1991, one month
after M&A's auto-qualification agreement was terminated.
5624.)

(R. at

During cross-examination, Mr. Tom Crismon testified that

even though he tried to determine a specific date of his meeting
with Macris prior to signing the pre-incorporation agreement, he
could not.

The only purpose of this testimony was to argue that

Macris, operating on behalf of the Emily Rose Company, began
"competing" in a marketing company before the termination of
M&A' s auto-qualification agreement on or about March 11, 1991.
The evidence, however, did not support Images' theory.
Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion by
limiting this same testimony from Tom Crismon's brother, William
Crismon, the error is harmless since the Court found, and
appellant does not contest, the following findings:
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Macris & Associates' agreement with Images
were materially breached on March 11, 1991.
See Finding No. 37.
Mike Macris, his associated entities and
Macris & Associates, Inc., were under no
legal duty or restraint not to compete. See
Finding No. 50.
There was no credible evidence that Macris &
Associates competed or interfered with any of
Images' economic opportunities. See Finding
No. 53.
The trial court having modified its prior exclusionary
rulings concerning the testimony of Susan Franceschi, Thomas
Crismon and William Crismon from this trial, Images then had a
duty to preserve its record under Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, and to at least proffer to the trial judge how
the addition of William Crismon's testimony would have altered or
materially advanced this'trial, if at all.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected,
and . . . (2) in case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which
questions were asked.
Rulings on evidence are not as critical when the trial
is to the court rather than a jury because it can be assumed that
the court has, and will use, its superior knowledge as to
competency and evidentiary effect.

Super Tire Market, Inc. v.

Rollins, 417 P.2d 132 (Utah 1966).

Images can show no
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prejudicial error resulting from the exclusion of William
Crismon's testimony.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on
the fraudulent inducement claims on the grounds of collateral
estoppel.

Images is not permitted to split basic common facts

between two separate proceedings and then contend it should be
allowed to assert claims which it argues were not asserted in one
of the proceedings.

It is also not permitted to raise arguments

which it had the opportunity to present to the trial court, but
simply failed to do.
Images should not be allowed to challenge the trial
court's alter ego/agency findings when it fundamentally failed to
marshal the evidence and-when the trial court specifically found
Images materially breached the M&A Contract which findings
renders the alter ego/agency questions irrelevant.
Finally, Images should not be allowed to challenge the
trial court's decision to exclude certain testimony when it
directly violated the lower court's discovery order in an attempt
to "surprise" M&A, and even then, when the lower court relented
during the course of trial, Images made no proffer as to what
William Crismon's testimony would have been or why it was even
necessary in light of Tom Crismon's testimony.
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For all these reasons, the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment at the lower court should be
affirmed and Respondents awarded their costs herein.
DATED this 27th day of November, 1996.
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT,
BENDINGER & PETERSON
170 S. Main Street, Ste. 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 53 3-83 83
BY

^?^c^C

f?-

Attorneys for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27th day November, 1996, two copies
of BRIEF OF APPELLEE was served upon the person named below, at the
address set out below their name, either by mailing postage
prepaid, hand-delivery, Federal Express, or by telecopying to them
a true and correct copy of said document.
Dennis K. Poole
Andrea Nuffer
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
4543 South 700 East, Ste. 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
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<*1 U.S. Mail
] Federal Express
] Hand-Delivery
] Telefacsimile
] Other:

Tabl

c

\
N

Jon V. Harper (#1378)
1349 Bryan Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
(801) 597-5022
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
(801) 534-1700

Attorneys for Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party Defendant Mike Macris
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)i

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
THOMAS MOWER, an individual,

]

Defendants.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
;

Third-Party Plaintiff,
)
)

vs.
MIKE MACRIS,
Third-Party Defendant.

Civil No. 910400358
Judge Guy R. Burningham

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24,
and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Plaintiff") and ThirdParty Defendant Michael Macris ("Macris") appeared and were represented by counsel Thomas
R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Defendant") appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole,
Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and
witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being
advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah corporation which has been in

existence since November 1985.
2.

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images & Attitude, Inc., is a Utah

Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah.
3.

Third-Party Defendant Macris is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah.
4.

Defendant operated a multilevel marketing business out of Salem, Utah, until

August 31, 1992, at which time Defendant ceased to operate the multilevel marketing operation
and transferred it to Neways, Inc.
5.

Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant.

6.

Thomas E. Mower ("Mower") founded Defendant and served as its President at

least through August 31, 1992. Mower is also President of Neways.
2

7.

Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a

business by "sponsoring" them and share in the profits that those people bring in by sponsoring
other people creating what is called a "downline." More people create a greater volume of sales
upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation. There is an incentive
to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a much greater amount
because of the volume created by the organization. Encouragement to build "width" is usually
a part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also
continue to grow. One incentive is to "sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the
money eventually grows through the duplicating efforts of "building the business."
8.

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement which waived the normal

requirements for ordinary distributors. Plaintiff was considered to have special expertise and
connections that would benefit Defendant, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements.
As an incentive and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant's organization and sponsor some
of Plaintiffs connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under it marketing plan, pursuant
to an "Addendum to Distributor Application," with hand printed language noting, "Ultimate
objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products." The
language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted by Macris on the Plaintiffs
Addendum at Mower's request, changing the wording of the second hand-printed phrase as
follows: "As long as Distributor is active in promoting Images and Images products."
3

9.

No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate objective," but progress was

being made during the time the parties were working together. Similarly, no criteria were
established to determine what was meant by being "active in promoting Images and Images
products."
10.

The Distributor Application and the Addendum to Distributor Application together

became the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
11.

Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker Aliprandi ("Hunsaker") into Defendant and

assisted her in building her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the
parties' contract.
12.

Plaintiff and Hunsaker agreed verbally at the time they executed the Addendums

that they would work together to build the width of the Hunsaker distributorship to the
Presidential level of Defendant's marketing plan before building out Plaintiffs organizational
width.

Images was aware of the agreement to build out Hunsaker's distributorship first.

Defendant was also aware that Plaintiff placed distributors under the Hunsaker distributorship
rather than directly under its own distributorship. Defendant was aware of this procedure by
its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until 1991.
13.

Plaintiff introduced Glenn Tillotson ("Tillotson") to Defendant. Tillotson had

significant experience in building a large multilevel marketing organization. Tillotson assisted
in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant.
14.

Plaintiff also recruited Haydon and Joanne Cameron (the "Camerons") into

Defendant. Haydon Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing and in placing
4

articles and advertisements in the national media concerning multilevel marketing opportunities
and products.
15.

Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of its activity from August 1989

through March 1991, in "promoting Images and Images products." The evidence shows that
Plaintiff was active in promoting Defendant and Defendant's products by attending meetings,
recruiting individuals, promoting Defendant's products, developing marketing strategies, training
and motivating other distributors for Defendant, consulting with Defendant on ways to improve
its marketing plan, and travelling for Defendant. Plaintiff expended money, including financial
support to a down line distributor for travel expenses, to accomplish these activities.
16.

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images and

Images products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its contract
with Defendant which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of Defendant's marketing
plan and to maintain its status as distributor for Defendant. Throughout the period from August
1989 until March 1991, Defendant paid Plaintiff at the highest level of Defendant's marketing
plan, according to the Addendum.
17.

In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard work

of Hunsaker and Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first distributorship in
Defendant's organization to achieve the presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during the
period from August 1989 through August 1992, at which time Neways took over the multilevel
marketing operation.
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18.

In spite of Plaintiffs activity level in the first half of 1990, Defendant notified

Plaintiff in an undated letter received on April 27, 1990, that its autoqualification status under
the Addendum to Distributor Application was being terminated. This termination notice was
sent at a time when Plaintiffs earnings from its distributorship were increasing significantly (as
was anticipated in the bargain) and meant that Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand
dollars less than it should have been under the Addendum.
19.

Plaintiff immediately contacted Mower in his hotel room in California and

complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the Addendum.
Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination.
20.

In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to

experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail gel.
21.

In the attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Macris, on behalf of

Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") - a company in which Macris was involved but which was separate
and distinct from Plaintiff and had its own contractual relationship with Defendant as a supplier - had individuals sample various gels to determine whether they could use the gels without
irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were appropriate.
22.

Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Hunsaker, who had tried various gel

samples for Affinity even before becoming a distributor for Defendant. Affinity also provided
various gel samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity
also provided gel samples to Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and various distributors
to try the samples.
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23.

In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to "Mike Maoris Affinity," Mower,

on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to distributors to test before
Defendant had seen the new gels. Mower explained that he had not seen Affinity's new gel but
had heard about it from distributors. Mower requested that Affinity not supply any gels to
Defendant's distributors to sample unless Defendant was also given the gels.
24.

Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Maoris, on behalf of Affinity, always

provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributor sampled the gel.
25.

Defendant also began testing its own new gels on its distributors, including on

Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds — the two distributors who tried Affinity's new gels. Hunsaker
reported to Mower her impressions of any new gel she tried for Affinity.

Mower never

instructed her not to test or sample Affinity's gels.
26.

Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to any of Defendant's

distributors.
27.

In June 1990, Defendant hired Macris to serve as National Sales Director. As

part of his compensation, Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of Defendant's gross
sales.
28.

Mower told Macris that, because he was the principal person operating Plaintiffs

distributorship, while he served as National Sales Director, Plaintiff would be deemed to be
active in promoting Defendant and Defendant's products under the Addendum, stating "it's all
the same."
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29.

In early August 1990, Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with

Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised
commission and business practices of Defendant.
30.

In response, Defendant sent Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990, terminating him

effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated that it would not pay Macris the promised
commission on all of its sales — only on sales in the United States.
31.

In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the month

of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiffs downline. Plaintiff
sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the intentional deletion of
this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the downline.
32.

Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by Defendant caused additional

difficulties between the parties including the need for attorney involvement demanding payment
and delivery of monies due.
33.

On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's

headquarters with Mower, Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney, in part to persuade Defendant to
release a check being held by Defendant payable to Plaintiff.
34.

In the November 7, 1990 meeting, several matters were discussed in addition to

the above matter, including a request by Mower for a new addendum with Plaintiff. The new
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach the presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line
to Plaintiff) within two years. Plaintiff indicated that it would consider the proposal, which
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Mower was to memorialize in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered to
Plaintiff.
35.

The parties continued to have difficulties and discussed new agreements into

January 1991. The parties were never able to agree to new terms. Defendant insisted upon
imposing a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve presidential
status, and imposing a higher standard of "active" which would allow Defendant to terminate
Plaintiffs distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite activity at the
higher level.

Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new

consideration was offered by Defendant to Plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was unwilling
to agree to the higher standard of "active" and the termination terms being proposed.
36.

At the time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to

replace the Addendum, both parties were aware that Plaintiffs earnings were going to increase
dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement.
37.

In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by Plaintiff on March

11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification status of
the distributorship for lack of activity. There was no mention of any other basis for Defendant's
action in that letter. Based upon the level of activity of Plaintiff, this act constituted a material
breach of the contract between the parties, by the Defendant.
38.

Plaintiff fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract and had been "active in

promoting Images and Images products."
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39.

At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing

dramatically.
40.

Defendant warned Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs

autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds for
terminating Plaintiff.

Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to Defendant's

distributors.
41.

In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs

autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant
gave Plaintiff "formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The
reasons given were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the
Addendum, and damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force. The evidence did
not support the stated reasons for termination, all of which were without merit. Plaintiff had
not engaged in conduct which violated Plaintiffs policies and procedures or the contract.
42.

The reasons given by Defendant for terminating Plaintiff after already terminating

Plaintiffs autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991,
were all pretextual and without merit, and did not justify termination of Plaintiff.
43.

After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay Plaintiff

for the month of February 1991, or thereafter.
44.

The money not paid by Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted

Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff.
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45.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach of

its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for the
month of February 1991, which amount the Court has already entered partial summary judgment
in favor of the Plaintiff.
46.

Also as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach

of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages for amounts which Defendant should
have paid to Plaintiff for subsequent months, from March 1991 through August 1992, when
Neways took over the multilevel marketing operation. Defendant has stipulated to the following
amounts for those months:
March 1991

15,112.33

April 1991

22,221.57

May 1991

24,865.61

June 1991

22,905.35

July 1991

27,227.69

August 1991

23,913.41

September 1991

27,063.79

October 1991

28,627.10

November 1991

20,890.65

December 1991

15,974.44

January 1992

18,928.07

February 1992

17,854.18

47.

March 1992

18,122.16

April 1992

15,911.97

May 1992

13,364.27

June 1992

12,692.71

July 1992

12,103.22

August 1992

13,263.72

Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the

Plaintiffs Addendum.
48.

Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, Plaintiff would have received

payments of $360,681.20 through August 31, 1992. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs damages
through August 31, 1992 as a result of Defendant's breach.
49.

The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they came

due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of February
16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and interest on the
judgment at the rate of 9.22 % after the date judgment is entered.
50.

Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither Plaintiff nor Third-Party

Defendant Macris was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant.
51.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Plaintiff breached

its contract with Defendant.
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52.

Maoris's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose were not done either

as an agent or representative for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff never had any contractual relationship
with Emily Rose.
53.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or

Macris interfered with Defendant's contractual relations or potential contractual relations, or that
either Plaintiff or Macris interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations.
There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Defendant was injured or damaged
by any alleged acts of interference by either Plaintiff or Macris.
54.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that any contracts or

potential contracts with Defendant were breached as a result of either Plaintiffs or Macris's
alleged actions.
55.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or

Macris engaged in any activities for the purpose of wrongfully interfering with Defendant's
existing or potential contractual relations.
56.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or

Macris intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an
improper purpose which predominated over any other purpose, or that either Plaintiff or Macris
used improper means to intentionally interfere with Defendant's existing or potential economic
relations.
57.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Macris &

Associates, Inc. is the alter ego of Michael Macris, or that Michael Macris is the alter ego of
13

Macris & Associates, Inc. There was ample evidence that adequate corporate formalities were
met and that each maintained their separate legal personalities.
58.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that observance of the

corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Macris sanctioned a fraud, promoted an injustice or
resulted in an inequity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The following Conclusions of Law are in addition to those Findings of Fact set forth
hereinabove which may be properly characterized as Conclusions of Law:
1.

The Distributor Application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the Addendum

thereto constituted a single integrated contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
2.

Based on Plaintiffs level of activity, Plaintiff, at all times relevant, was "active

in promoting Images and Images products." Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of
the contract between the parties until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract.
3.

Defendant materially breached the contract between the parties when it suspended

Plaintiffs autoqualification status for lack of activity, through its letter dated March 7, 1991.
4.

Defendant also materially breached the contract between the parties when it ceased

paying Plaintiff under the contract between the parties.
5.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's material breach(es), Plaintiff

suffered damages through August 31, 1992 in the stipulated amount of $360,681.20, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $116,087.49 as of February 16, 1995. After
February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82.
14

6.

Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third-Party Defendant, nor is Third-Party

Defendant the alter ego of Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities and the
observance of the corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant would not
sanction a fraud, promote an injustice or result in an inequity. Therefore, Defendant's First
Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on alter ego, is without merit
or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
7.

Plaintiff performed according to all of the conditions of its contract with

Defendant until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract, and Plaintiff did not materially
breach the contract. Therefore, Defendant's Second Cause of Action, based on breach of
contract, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
8.

Based on Defendant's stipulation during the trial of this matter, by and through

their counsel, Defendant's Third Cause of Action, based on defamation, was dismissed with
prejudice.
9.

Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff of Third-Party Defendant

intentionally induced any third party, including any of Defendant's distributors, to breach a
contract with Defendant which, as a direct or proximate result, injured or cause damage to
Defendant. As such, Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendant, based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal
basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
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10.

Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff or Third-Party Defendant

intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an improper
purpose or by improper means, thereby injuring or causing damage to Defendant. As such,
Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on
intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and shall be
dismissed with prejudice.
11.

Neither Plaintiffs nor Third-Party Defendant's acts or omissions complained of

in any of Defendant's causes of action were the result of willful or malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and
disregard of, the rights of others and, therefore, Defendants are not entitled to any punitive
damages. Therefore, Defendant's Seventh Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendant, based on punitive damages, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed
with prejudice.
12.

Plaintiffs claims are not barred by (1) the statute of frauds, (2) the parol evidence

rule, or (3) the doctrines of laches, waiver or estoppel as Defendants' claimed in the Answer to
Second Amended Complaint.
13.

Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief

was dismissed with prejudice at trial.
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14.

Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the

Joann Cameron distributorship was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Plaintiffs motion and
Defendant's stipulation.
15.

Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the

car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiffs
stipulation.
16.

Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade

practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial.
The foregoing findings and conclusions are cross-adopted to the extent a conclusion has
been misidentified as a finding or a finding has been misidentified as a conclusion.
DATED this

day of

<^-4f^+~£<A~, 1995.
BY THE COURTS / - k - ^ g ,A

^

Judgetjuy R^Burmngham
APPROVED BY:

S^

DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES

,
***££**£"'

Dennis K. Poole
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTk
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.

CASE NO. 910400358

~7T-

Plaintiff,
DATE: JUNE 6, 1995

vs.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
THOMAS MOWER, an individual,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendants.

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

vs.
MIKE MACRIS,
Third-Party Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21,
22, 24, and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff appeared and was represented by
counsel Thomas R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and
Nancy Mismash. The Third-Party Defendant appeared and was represented by Thomas R.
Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Court thereupon heard evidence by
the parties and witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and
exhibits and upon being advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS
1. The Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah Corporation.

nor* A

2. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Images & Attitude, Inc. is a Utah
Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah.
3. Third-Party Defendant, Mike Macris is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
4. Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff.
5. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff operated a multilevel marketing business out
of Salem, Utah at times pertinent to this matter.
6. Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a
business by " sponsoringH them and share in the profits that those people bring in by
sponsoring other people creating what is called a "downline." More people create a greater
volume of sales upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation.
There is an incentive to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a
much greater amount because of the volume created by the organization. One incentive is to
"sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the money eventually grows through the
duplicating efforts of "building the business." Encouragement to build "width" is usually a
part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also
continue to grow . In this action, Plaintiff was not paid very much money in the early
months, when it worked the hardest on its distributorship.
7. Plaintiff and Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff entered into an agreement
which waived the normal requirements required of ordinary sponsors. Plaintiff was
considered to have special expertise and connections that would benefit the Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements. As an incentive
and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant organization and sponsor some of its
connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under its marketing plan, pursuant to an
"Addendum to Distributor Application", with hand printed language noting, "Ultimate
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objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products."
The language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted on the Joanne Cameron
addendum by Mr. Thomas Mower and inserted on the Macris & Associates and Margie
Hunsaker addendum by Mike Macris at Mr. Mower's request.
8. The arrangement seemed to have worked without major problems from August
1989 through March 7, 1991. No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate
objective," but progress was being made during the time the parties were working together.
9. Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker into Defendant and assisted her in building
her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the parties contract.
10.

Plaintiff used its efforts to build the Hunsaker organization, before it developed

its own organizational width, which was the agreement of the parties. Defendant was aware
of this procedure by its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until
1991.
11. Plaintiff introduced an individual named Glenn Tillotson to the Defendant
organization. Mr. Tillotson had significant experience in building a large multilevel
marketing organization. Although Mr. Tillotson did not personally join Defendant
organization, he assisted in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant.
12. Haydon and Joanne Cameron are individuals Plaintiff recruited into Defendant.
At the time of recruitment, Mr. Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing
and in placing articles and advertisements in the national media regarding multilevel
marketing opportunities and products.
13. Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of "actively promoting"
Defendant's products from August 1989 until 1991, when Defendant terminated Plaintiff.
Meetings were attended, individuals were recruited, products were promoted, training,
motivation, and travel were accomplished by the Plaintiff. The expenditure of money was
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made by the Plaintiff to accomplish these activities. These activities were done by the
Plaintiff to promote Defendant and Defendant's products.
14.

At all times relevant to this action Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images

and Images' products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its
contract with the Defendant, which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of
Defendant's marketing plan.
15.

In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard

work of Margie Hunsaker and Glenn Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first
Images distributorship to achieve the Presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during
the period from August 1989 through August 1992, at which time Neways took over the
multilevel operation.
16.

In an undated letter, received by the Plaintiff April 27, 1990, Defendant

notified the Plaintiff that its autoqualification status under the addendum to distributor
application was being terminated. This termination notice was sent at a time when the
earnings of Plaintiff were increasing significantly (as was anticipated in the bargain) and
Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand dollars less than it should have been under
the addendum agreement.
17.

Plaintiff immediately contacted Thomas Mower in his hotel room in California

and complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the
addendum. Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination.
18.

In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to

experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail
gel.
19.

In an attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Mike Macris, on behalf

of Affinity, Inc., had individuals sample various gels to determine whether they could use the
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gels without irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were
appropriate.
20. Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Margie Hunsaker, who had tried various
gel samples for Affinity even before becoming an Images distributor. Affinity also provided
samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity also
provided gel samples to the Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and distributors to try
the samples.
21.

In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to "Mike Macris Affinity,"

Thomas Mower, on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to
distributors to test before Defendant had seen the new gels. Mr. Mower explained that he
had not seen Affinity's new gel but had heard about it from distributors. Mr. Mower
requested that Affinity not supply any gels to Defendant's distributors to sample unless
Defendant was also given the gels.
22.

Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Mr. Macris, on behalf of Affinity,

always provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributors sampled the gel.
23.

Defendant also began testing its own gels on its distributors, including Ms.

Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds. Ms. Hunsaker reported to Mr. Mower her impressions of any
new gel she tried for Affinity. Mr. Mower never instructed her not to test or sample
Affinity gels.
24.

Plaintiff never supplied gels to any Defendant distributors.

25.

In June 1990, Defendant hired Mike Macris to serve as National Sales

Director. As part of his compensation, Mr. Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of
Defendant's gross sales.
26. Mr. Mower told Mr. Macris that while he served as National Sales Director,
Plaintiff would be deemed to be active in promoting Defendant's products under the
addendum, stating "its all the same."
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27. In early August 1990, Mr. Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with
the Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised
commission and business practices of the Defendant.
28.

In response, Defendant sent Mike Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990,

terminating him effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated they would not pay Mr.
Macris the commission on all sales, but would on sales in the United States.
29. In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the
month of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiffs
downline. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the
deletion of this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the
downline.
30. Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by the Defendant caused
additional difficulties between the parties including involving attorney involvement
demanding payment and delivery of monies due.
31.

On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's

headquarters with Thomas Mower, the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney, in part to persuade
Defendant to release a check being held by Defendant payable to the Plaintiff.
32.

Several matters were discussed in addition to the above matter, including a

request by Thomas Mower for a new addendum agreement with the Plaintiff. The new
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line to
Plaintiff). Plaintiff said he would consider the proposal and Mr. Mower was to memorialize
it in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered at this meeting.
33.

The parties continued to have difficulties and discuss new agreements into

January 1991. The parties were never able to come to new terms. Defendant unilaterally
imposed a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve
presidential status and imposed a higher standard of "active" which would allow Defendant to
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terminate the distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite "activity"
at the higher level. Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new
consideration was offered by Defendant to plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was
unwilling to agree to the higher standard of "activef,and termination terms being proposed.
34. At this time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to
replace the addendum. Both parties were aware that the earnings of Plaintiff were going to
increase dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement.
35.

In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by the Plaintiff on

March 11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification
status of the distributorship for lack of activity. Based upon the level of activity of the
Plaintiff, this act constituted a material breach of the contract between the parties, by the
Defendant.
36.

Macris & Associates, Inc. fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract.

37. Defendant ceased making payments pursuant to the contract and
suspended/terminated the Addendum for Plaintiff, thus breaching the contract.
38.

At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing

dramatically.
39. The Defendant warned the Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating the
autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds
for terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested gels or provided gels to Defendant's
distributors.
40. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating the autoqualification
status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant gave Plaintiff
"formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The reasons given
were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the Addendum, and
damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force.
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41. The three reasons given above were all without merit.
42. After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay
Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, or thereafter.
43. The money not paid by the Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted
the Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff.
44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach
of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for
the month of February 1991, which amount the court has already entered partial summary
judgment if favor of the Plaintiff.
45. The amounts which should have been paid by Defendant to Plaintiff for
subsequent months are as follows:
March 1991

$15,112.33

April 1991

22,221.57

May 1991

24,865.61

June 1991

22,905.35

July 1991

27,227.69

August 1991

23,913.41

September 1991

27,063.79

October 1991

28,627.10

November 1991

20,890.65

December 1991

15,974.44

January 1992

18,928.07

February 1992

17,854.18

March 1992

18,122.16

April 1992

15,911.97

May 1992

13,364.27
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June 1992

12,692.71

July 1992

12,103.22

August 1992

13,263.72

46. Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the
Plaintiffs Addendum.
47. Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, the Plaintiff would have received
payments, based upon the formula of $360,681.20. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs
damages as a result of Defendant's breach.
48. The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they
came due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of
February 16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and
interest on the judgment at the rate of 9.22% after the date judgment is entered.
49.

Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither the Plaintiff nor Third

Party Defendant was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant.
50. Third Party Defendant's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose
were not done either as agent or representative for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff never had any
contractual relationship with Emily Rose.
51. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant interfered with Defendant's
contractual relations, potential contractual relations, or existing or potential economic
relations. Defendant has not been damaged by any acts of either the Plaintiff or the Third
Party Defendant.
52.

Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third Party Defendant, nor is Third Party

Defendant the alter ego of the Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities.
53. The Distributor application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the addendum
thereto constituted an integrated contract between the parties.
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54. Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of the contract until Defendant
wrongfully breached the contract,
55. Defendant failed to establish that any alleged breach of contractual relations by
Plaintiff or Third Party Defendant injured or caused damage to Defendants.
56. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant intentionally interfered with or
procured any breach of any contract with any Defendant distributor or potential distributor.
57. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant acted maliciously, intentionally,
recklessly, or fraudulently. Punitive damages would not be appropriate.
58. Defendant and Third Party Plaintiffs claims against the Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendant are without merit or legal basis and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare, serve opposing counsel and submit
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and Judgment consistent with this decision.

Dated this Q? day of June, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

BURNINGHAM^^GE

cc: Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.; Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq.
Jon V. Harper, Esq.
Dennis K. Poole, Esq.; Andrea Nuffer, Esq.; Nancy Mismash, Esq.
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<Sr.
^

Jon V. Harper (#1378)
1349 Bryan Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
(801) 597-5022
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
(801) 534-1700

WRORwer

-SL A3.T

Attorneys for Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party Defendant Mike Macris
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
THOMAS MOWER, an individual,
Defendants.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Civil No. 910400358
Judge Guy R. Burningham

vs.
MIKE MACRIS,
Third-Party Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24
and 27, 1995 and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party
Defendant Michael Macris appeared and were represented by counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg,
Jon V. Harper and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images &
Attitude, Inc. appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy A.
Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and the witnesses in support of
their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being advised in the premises,
it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Judgment is hereby entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the following

amounts: (a) $360,681.20, constituting Plaintiffs damages through August 31, 1992, as a result
of Defendant's breach of its contract with Plaintiff; (b) $126,957.67 constituting pre-judgment
interest on the principal amount as of June 6, 1995; and (c) per diem pre-judgment interest of
$98.82 per day from June 6, 1995 until Judgment is entered by this Court (together representing
the "Judgment Amount"). Following the entry of this Judgment, interest on the Judgment
Amount shall accrue at the rate of 9.22% per annum.
2.

Defendant's First Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on alter ego, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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10.

Plaintiff's Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the

car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiffs
stipulation.
11.

Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade

practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial.
DATED: September M

, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED BY:
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES

Dennis K. Poole
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff

0620judg.50a
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3.

Defendant's Second Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on breach of contract, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
4.

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action against Plaintiff and

Third-Party Defendant, based on defamation, was voluntarily dismissed by Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff at the conclusion of Plaintiffs case at trial and is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
5.

Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal basis and
is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
6.

Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
7.

Defendant' s Seventh Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on punitive damages, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
8.

Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief

was dismissed with prejudice at trial.
9.

Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the

JoAnn Cameron distributorship was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and
Plaintiffs stipulation.
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Tab 4

DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(801) 263-3344
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah
corporation; and THOMAS MOWER, an
individual,
Defendants,
Civil No.

910400358

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third Party Plaintiff
vs.
MIKE MACRIS,
Judge: Guy R. Burningham
Third-party Defendant

Based upon the Stipulation of the parties hereto, and for good
cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:

MACRIS.ORD

(EC)

1.

That the discovery cut off in this matter be and is

hereby extended through December 1, 1994.
2.

That Defendants Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower

shall provide the Plaintiff with an up-dated witness list on or
before September 16, 1994, which witness list may thereafter be
supplemented.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine be and is hereby withdrawn,

without prejudice.
ORDER DATED this ( (*

day of September, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

'Si
CT/COURT JUDGE
DISTRIC
APPROVERS TO FORM:

/«9- ??
THOMAS R. I^RRENBERG
ANDERSON & KARRENBERC
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Third-Party Defendants

MACRIS.ORD

(EC)
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